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Scientifi c article
ASSESSMENT OF THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY 
FROM CBRN TERRORISM
Gjorgji VELJOVSKI1
Metodija DOJCHINOVSKI2
Abstract: The main characteristic of  modern day terrorism is the use of indiscriminate violence 
to accomplish its objectives. However, only recently in the past decades, the terrorist threat in-
creased its level of horror with the increased possibility of terrorist groups and organizations to 
use chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons (CBRN). Almost all member states 
of the United Nations agreed on controlling the development of nuclear energy and the prohibi-
tion of chemical and biological weapons. The international community has designed many 
mechanisms for arms control and proliferation of dangerous materials, like radiological waste 
or biological and chemical agents, which could be used to make weapons of mass destruction. 
The problem arises when it comes to non-state actors, such as terrorist groups and organiza-
tions. Despite the technological development and international laws, it is diffi cult to control their 
intentions. The mere perception that non-state actors, such as terrorist groups with unrestricted 
moral values, could obtain weapons made of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear 
origin, keeps the global security makers vigilant and focused on its prevention. It is necessary 
to monitor their activities and ambitions to acquire such capabilities. There are just enough 
recorded terrorist attempts to obtain dangerous substances in order to prepare improvised 
weapons of mass destruction not to dismiss the threat as unrealistic. The purpose of this paper 
is to consider the facts of the level of threat to national security, acknowledging the technical 
constraints and opportunities for terrorists to develop and use such weapons. The assessment 
will take in consideration the existence of several sponsor states of terrorism that could facilitate 
the proliferation of these weapons to the third party actors.
Keywords: national security, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons, terror-
ism, non-state actors, sponsor states.
Introduction
Immediately after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Western governments increased 
their vigilance for the possibility of terrorist use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear 
based weapons (CBRN). From today’s perspective, knowing the reason for the invasion of Iraq and 
1  The author is lieutenant colonel of the ARM and MSc at the  Military Academy “Gen. Mihailo 
Apostolski”, Skopje
2  The author is colonel of the ARM and professor at the Military Academy “Gen. Mihailo Ap-
ostolski”, Skopje
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the fact that the coalition forces did not fi nd any weapons of mass destruction, the question arises to 
what extent the threat is real for the non-state actors to develop, produce and obtain such weapons.
The reason why during the Cold War the superpowers never used unconventional weapons 
was due to the strategies of deterrence and massive response. Both sides have refrained because 
they were aware that the response would be overwhelming for either of the sides, or the fear of the 
so-called Mutual Assured Destruction. But the terrorists today have no home country so they do 
not fear punishment, meaning the strategy of the Western massive response has no special effect.3
When it comes to threat to national security from CBRN terrorism, it is estimated that the 
religious terrorist groups are more dangerous in a moral sense compared to the secular terrorist 
groups. Hence the fear that has emerged in the West in terms of “unstable” and “rogue” states that 
could develop and provide CBRN weapons to terrorist organizations. The prevention has become 
a priority for the West and counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is one of the main 
missions of special operations forces. If there is a slightest doubt about facilities that may be used 
to develop such weapons, the West would not hesitate to use force once they have exhausted all 
mechanisms and verify the information.
The question remains - what is the possibility that a terrorist organization manages to 
produce, acquire, and use CBRN materials as weapons. The views are different and vary from 
those optimistic that the likelihood of such an attack is very small, to overblown paranoid views 
that terrorists could obtain such weapons and will not hesitate to use them. Despite the numerous 
incidents in the past four decades, the only serious terrorist attack using Sarin gas was conducted in 
the Tokyo subway in 1995, killing 12 and wounding 5000 people.4 There are many challenges and 
scientifi c technological constraints that the terrorist groups and organizations as non-state actors 
have to overcome to obtain such weapons. In order to apply the right amount of countermeasures, 
we need a realistic assessment of the possibility of such a scenario.
While the production of weapons of mass destruction is a complex process, procurement 
through various channels of transnational crime is a real possibility that should not be excluded. 
The existence of “unstable” and “rogue” states is part of the equation of the possibility that ter-
rorist organizations may reach some kind of CBRN based weapons. While many authors exclude 
the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons as impossible, there is still a threat of obtaining 
chemical, biological and especially radiological weapons. The motive of groups and organizations 
to use such weapons is suffi cient for the international community and security systems to worry 
that it is a real danger.
 
Challenges and limitations of CBRN terrorism
Although in the past 15 years, both democratic and republican administrations 
in the US government identifi ed the possibility of terrorist use of CBRN weapons as 
the biggest threat to US national security, there are many sceptics that believe that such 
threat is practically zero.5 Most of the authors agree that the non-state actors could not 
even come close to producing or obtaining CBRN capability, especially nuclear. 
3 Derek D. Smith. (2006). Deterring America: Rogue States and the Proliferation of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction. Cambridge University Press, 3.
4 Benjamin Cole. (2011). The changing face of terrorism: How real is the threat from biological, 
chemical and nuclear weapons? Tauris. London, 17.
5 Graham Allison, forwarding Rolf Mowatt-Larssen. (2010). Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruc-
tion threat: Hype or reality?. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Harvard Kennedy School
112
INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC JOURNAL
CONTEMPORARY MACEDONIAN DEFENCE
In order to understand the extent of the possibility of a terrorist organization 
developing CBRN weapons, it is necessary to be acquainted with the complexity and 
cost of such a process. Experts who are more versed in the process of how to obtain such 
technology, consider it very diffi cult even if such a project is state sponsored. There are 
many examples that even with the necessary state efforts, it takes decades to develop 
and produce CBRN weapons. Thus, it is a valid assumption that it is a particularly 
diffi cult and complex task for the non-state actors, such as terrorist organizations, to 
achieve this.
 Because it is almost impossible to steal CBRN weapons from a state that 
possesses it, the terrorists will have to develop it themselves. Producing chemical 
weapons is probably easiest of all, assuming some developed state provides the 
necessary facilities. Developing usable biological weapons is harder, and the most 
diffi cult is the nuclear weapons. This means that the terrorist organizations seeking 
to develop CBRN weapons must have some developed state sponsor behind them to 
make it possible.
To develop CBRN weapons, above all it is necessary to have scientific 
knowledge related to chemistry, physics and biology. Although today, there is raw 
theoretical information easily accessible online, it is not suffi cient to produce CBRN 
weapons. In developing such technology, there is a complex process of testing and 
experimentation, and many details needed to get to the fi nal product are simply not 
found in the books. Even if the terrorists try to make improvised CBRN weapon from 
commercially available chemicals and insecticides or radiological waste, they will still 
need a professional scientifi c help.
It took the Japanese cult Aum Shinrijko two years to produce 30 litres of Sarin 
gas, having 300 engineers in their ranks and lots of money.6 The only way to accelerate 
the process is an expert with a personal experience in the preparation of such agents 
recruited to help manufacturing. When it comes to development of nuclear weapons, 
it is far more complicated and impossible for the non-state actors. The North Korean 
nuclear program due to seclusion dragged for years and still did not achieve the desired 
results. Those countries that have nuclear weapons spent decades and billions of dollars 
on research, testing and experimentation to come up with a fi nal product.
Regarding biological weapons, it is easier to develop bacteria and toxins than 
viruses, but still complicated to turn them into weapons. In 1991, it was determined that 
Saddam Hussein’s engineers spent years working on biological weapons and still failed 
to make it.7 The biggest obstacle for countries that made usable biological weapons 
was how to make it stable after it is put in the ammunition.
Materials to make nuclear weapons are so delicate and well kept by the states 
that it is certainly out of the terrorist reach. The process is so complex and requires 
6 Benjamin Cole. (2011). The changing face of terrorism: How real is the threat from biological, 
chemical and nuclear weapons? Tauris. London, 42.
7 Ibid., 46.
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so much time, that we can assume that there is not a terrorist organization that would 
lose so much time on developing a nuclear bomb. The threat of terrorist organizations 
to self-develop a nuclear device in the near future is unrealistic. However, there are 
radioactive materials like plutonium and depleted uranium that the terrorists could 
somehow acquire. Although the effects would be smaller, it is possible to infl ict great 
damage if combined in the form of a “dirty bomb.” Theoretically, a team of a few 
physicists who do have knowledge and enough material, which can be up to a ton, 
could make a so-called “crude” nuclear bomb, but still not having nearly the effect of 
a real nuclear bomb.8
The “dirty bombs” are radiological weapons and a lot easier to produce 
than nuclear weapons. Unlike nuclear weapons, where the damage is infl icted with 
the explosion, the radiological weapons achieve the effects by contaminating the 
environment. The “dirty bombs” are actually ordinary bombs which scatter radioactive 
material into the environment. Some of the isotopes that could be used to make a 
radiological bomb are commercially used in hospitals. Vulnerability is identifi ed to 
national security in the possibility of a terrorist organization attacking and stealing 
radiological materials during transport. Furthermore, any country that possesses nuclear 
plants has raw nuclear material.
Unstable or rogue states would unlikely voluntarily give CBRN weapons to 
terrorists, because it would certainly become a target of attack for the West. It is more 
likely that terrorists could steal CBRN weapons from states with weaker security 
control. According to the data of the International Atomic Energy Agency, from 1993 
to 2006 there were 1080 incidents categorized as attempts to smuggle nuclear materials, 
and 67% of the missing or stolen materials have never been found.9 After the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, there have been about 700 registered attempts to steal nuclear 
materials, and in 1998 the Russian intelligence revealed a plan for stealing 18 kilograms 
of uranium from the nuclear power plant Chelyabinsk that was scheduled to be sold 
on the black market.10 Between 2002 and 2004, international experts gathered 105 
kilograms of uranium from several countries as Uzbekistan, Bulgaria, Libya, Romania 
and the Czech Republic.11
The irony for the terrorists is that while the nuclear weapons are the most diffi cult 
to produce, if obtained, they would be easiest to use. On the other hand, the chemical 
weapons are easier to improvise, but not as simple to use because in order to achieve 
mass casualties, one needs to expose the target to it for a longer time. Perhaps that 
is why it is unlikely that the terrorists would want to waste time on CBRN weapons, 
8 Ibid., 38.
9 Benjamin Cole. (2011). The changing face of terrorism: How real is the threat from biological, 
chemical and nuclear weapons? Tauris. London, 49.
10 David Baker. (2006). Biological, nuclear, and chemical weapons: Fighting terrorism. Rourke 
Publishing LLC. USA, 36.
                     11 Ibid., 37.
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there is no guarantee to make it work, and even if they do, it is quite diffi cult to deploy 
it on the target. 
Because the probability of non-state actors to develop and produce CBRN 
weapons on their own is very low, terrorist organizations and groups are in constant 
pursuit of sponsor states that could provide those weapons as a fi nal product. This 
threat is actually the closest to reality because there are many “unstable” and “rogue” 
states in the world that used to have or still have programs to develop chemical, bio-
logical, and even nuclear weapons.
According to the US government, the states that sponsor terrorism are those for 
which there is strong evidence they provide assistance or support to terrorist groups 
and organizations. In the period from 1979 to 1993, countries found on the list of 
states considered as sponsoring terrorism were Libya, Iraq, Iran, Yemen, Syria, Cuba, 
North Korea and Sudan. Today, still remaining on the list are Syria, Iran and Sudan. 
It is obvious that six out of eight countries on the list are also associated with reli-
gious extremism. Hence their interest and effort to develop, produce or obtain CBRN 
weapons. For some, like Syria and Libya it is known that besides production of large 
quantities of such weapons, they have also used it in practice.
Assessment of the possibility of terrorist use of CBRN weapons
The pressure from the West does not stop due to the fear that some terrorist or-
ganizations and groups could obtain CBRN weapons from a state sponsor. Although 
Libya was removed from the list in 2006, it is worrying that 10 years after the termina-
tion of the program and initiating the process of destroying the chemical weapons, the 
process is still not fi nished. There is a suspicion that some of these weapons in early 
2015 fell in the hands of the opposition rebel groups. 
While optimists claim that CBRN weapons can hardly fall into the hands of 
terrorists, no one goes to the extreme to exclude such a possibility, especially after 
the terrorists attack with mass casualties on September 11, 2001. Although terrorists 
are logistically limited, they are not limited by the lack of vision and creativity to use 
CBRN weapons.12 The reason why the terrorists would not hesitate to use weapons for 
mass casualties is the fact that such an attack, even on a tactical level, would complicate 
the military operations of the Western armies, thus having highly disruptive effects.13 
That is why these weapons are also referred to as “weapons of mass disruption” or 
“weapons of terror.” 14
Most of the analysts in the 20th century assumed that the terrorist organizations 
would not dare to use CBRN weapons. It was believed that if they did, they would 
lose political support or sympathies from their specifi c target group. But, with the 
12 David Santoro. (2010). Treating Weapons Proliferation:An Oncological Approach to the Spread 
of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Technology. Palgrave Macmillan, 112.
13 Ibid., 60.
14 Ibid., 60.
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emergence of Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State today, this is no longer valid. There is 
a new trend of terrorism today, and although its nature has remained the same, the 
goals have changed substantially. Today’s religious extremists are different from the 
groups and organizations in the 70s and 80s, who had exclusively ethno-nationalist 
and ideological motives, as neo-Nazi and racist groups in the United States.15 Today’s 
religious terrorism is a greater threat in terms of causing mass casualties.
There are three factors that after the end of the Cold War signifi cantly contributed 
to increased concerns about the possibility of terrorist attacks with CBRN weapons. 
First, because of the uncertainty of securing such weapons after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, second, the emergence of the new kind of terrorism, and third, the United 
States emerging as a new target for terrorism in the Middle East.16
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was a widespread concern in the 
West about the nuclear waste and materials which were suspected to be circulating in 
some former Soviet republics. Such a scenario was closely monitored by the West, 
demanding from Russia to prove that it has an insight and control of potentially 
dangerous substances. At the same time, such a Western attitude may have been aimed 
at discrediting the capacity of the Russian government to manage effectively in the 
transition period. During the 90s, the West also projected the idea that the former Soviet 
scientists offered their skills in countries seeking development of nuclear weapons, such 
as Iran. However, it was never proved that any Soviet scientis was engaged in making 
any kind of weapons of mass destruction for the nationalist or religious groups.17
Besides organized groups, the attempts to obtain chemical and biological agents 
to be used for deadly attacks were perpetrated by individuals who have nothing to do 
with ideological organizations. This threat is lower because of the lack of organizational 
capacity, but on the other hand the seriousness to prevent such attacks is greater because 
there are more such actors in the security environment. Individuals who would obtain 
such agents tend to have lower moral restriction because they do not answer to anyone. 
This is due to the scientifi c and technological development, especially the increased role 
of the computer technology, and the Internet is making the exchange of information 
incomparably greater.
The increased use of computers provided the non-state actors and individuals with 
more detailed insight into the composition and methods of producing substances that 
could be used as a weapon, i.e. making “dirty bombs”. Terrorists with fake bank accounts 
and profi les are attempting through cyberspace to contact legitimate laboratories and 
researchers in various scientifi c institutions. So far such attempts have failed because 
15 Andrew Hubback. (1997). Apocalypse when? The global threat of religious cults. Confl ict 
Studies No. 300. Research Institute for the Study of Confl ict and Terrorism, 5.
16 Andrew O’Нeil. (2003). Terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction: how serious is the threat?. 
Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol.57, No.1, 100.
17 Benjamin Cole. (2011). The changing face of terrorism: How real is the threat from biological, 
chemical and nuclear weapons? Tauris. London, 35.
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the security measures are high and the identities of all who are trying to contact the 
scientifi c institutions are thoroughly checked.18
Since one of the indirect methods of terrorism is spreading fear through 
propaganda, terrorists are constantly projecting information that they intend to attack 
with CBRN weapons. Because of the numerous traces, and evidence that they have 
a great interest in possessing devastating weapons, the concern that it is possible is 
growing in the West. This may be good because it keeps the West vigilant, increasing the 
safety measures in the past two decades. On the other hand, the West may spend perhaps 
more resources than they actually need, favouring the terrorist tactics of defocusing 
the West and causing fi nancial damage similar to cyber terrorism.
Following the statements of politicians in the United States from the 90s, it 
seems that the CBRN threat for national security is exaggerated. In their rhetoric, 
they frequently warned that a CBRN attack by terrorists is not only possible, but 
inevitable, and that such probability is increasing every day. Although such attack has 
never occurred, perhaps these concerns contributed to increased vigilance and control 
over the institutions that produce and store chemical and biological agents, and also 
increased control of goods across the national borders.
There is an argument that the terrorists would not use CBRN weapons as feared. 
The main reason is the fear of a much larger military response from the West, but 
also undermining their political agenda to achieve their goal. In fact, causing mass 
casualties would not be useful to the terrorists.19 But is this valid for today’s kind of 
terrorism with such terrorist groups like the Islamic State that not only commit mass 
executions of innocent victims, but they record it and put it online to project terror. The 
question remains if such terrorists, with unprecedented fanaticism, primarily religiously 
motivated, will hesitate to use CBRN weapons if they have it?
Since nuclear materials are well controlled and stored in countries that have it, 
that would be the main source from which the terrorists could try to obtain them.20 There 
is the danger of unstable or rogue states deliberately or inadvertently facilitating such 
terrorists’ attempt. Monitoring the activities of the countries that are potential sponsors 
of terrorist organizations is an important mechanism to prevent CBRN weapons falling 
into the hands of terrorists.
To procure, steal, buy, transport and turn nuclear materials into weapons, is a 
long and complicated process with multiple stages. There are many procedures that 
the terrorists must attend to. This is benefi cial for the national security of the countries 
18 David Baker. (2006). Biological, nuclear, and chemical weapons: Fighting terrorism. Rourke 
Publishing LLC. USA, 34.
19 Benjamin Cole. (2011). The changing face of terrorism: How real is the threat from biological, 
chemical and nuclear weapons? Tauris. London, 22.
20 Thomas Graham Jr. Keith A. Hansen. (2009) Preventing Catastrophe. The Use and Misuse of 
Intelligence in Efforts to Halt the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Stanford security studies. 
Stanford University Press, California, 20.
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because the process can be stopped at several points, making it extremely diffi cult, 
fi rst to obtain such material, and second to turn it into a weapon. To disrupt the whole 
attempt it is suffi cient to stop the process anywhere, for example, increasing the control 
of the nuclear waste from the nuclear plant.
The former US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld warned that there are 
terrorist organizations that have cooperation and understanding with the countries that 
possess weapons of mass destruction, and that one day it will be inevitable that they 
will provide it to terrorists, who will not hesitate to use it.21 It is especially worrisome 
that the religiously motivated terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda would not hesitate 
to use such weapons if they obtain some.22
However, while the United States spent billions of dollars to protect themselves 
from terrorists who would use weapons of mass destruction, statistics show that it is 
more likely that the domestic terrorists conduct such attacks than someone from the 
outside. So far, more serious threat to the United States in particular are the extreme 
left and extreme right-wing groups than the terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda.23 
Scepticism about the possibility that terrorists could use CBRN weapons increased 
after the invasion of Iraq in 2003 when weapons of mass destruction, which served as 
a pretext for invasion against Saddam Hussein, were never found.24
The critics go as far as saying that the projection of fear of a terrorist attack 
using CBRN weapons that the Western countries generated for themselves, actually 
motivates terrorists to desire such weapons. In any case, it is better to cure and prevent 
rather than respond, because an armed action against a terrorist attack using CBRN 
weapons would be very complicated in today’s operational environment. Even if the 
state sponsoring terrorists that conducted CBRN attack is determined, designating 
military targets to respond would be very complex.
Conclusion
Although the only recorded, organized terrorist attack with CBRN weapons was the 
attack with Sarin gas in the Tokyo subway, there are still attempts to develop, acquire and 
ambitions to use it. Religious terrorism as a new trend is a particular threat because it has no 
moral restrictions. The probability of a terrorist organization to develop or obtain some kind of 
CBRN weapons depends primarily on the operational environment in which it operates. Due to 
21 Derek D. Smith. (2006). Deterring America: Rogue States and the Proliferation of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction. Cambridge University Press, 157.
22 Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A. Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks: A Net 
Assessment. (2007). London: Strategic Dossier of the IISS, 107.
23  Rachel Oswald. (2013 April 17). Despite WMD Fears, Terrorists Still Focused on Conventional 
Attacks. Global Security Newswire, National Journal. http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/despite-wmd-fears-
terrorists-still-focused-conventional-attacks/
24  Rolf Mowatt-Larssen. (2010). Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction threat: Hype or reality?. 
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Harvard Kennedy School, 8.
118
INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC JOURNAL
CONTEMPORARY MACEDONIAN DEFENCE
technological limitations, it is necessary to have assistance from a state that sponsors terrorism. 
Another possibility is through acquiring scientists and engineers who already have experience 
in making such weapons. There was a strong suspicion that the former Soviet engineers offered 
their services to countries that were trying to develop weapons of mass destruction. It is quite 
possible that in the future, discontented, individual actors with scientifi c knowledge in chemistry, 
physics and biology, may offer their services in exchange for personal gain.
However, at the moment, the level of threat of a terrorist attack using CBRN based 
weapons is very low. It is highly unlikely they will get to facilities to create such capacities, 
primarily because the US and its partners have high awareness of the danger, and thus control 
the proliferation of such materials. Because of Al Qaeda threats related to CBRN weapons, and 
the indiscriminate attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States managed to destroy most 
of the key leadership of Al Qaeda. 
Furthermore, from a technological point of view, it is not impossible that terrorist groups 
might develop some kind of improvised CBRN weapon, with the exception of nuclear, which 
is beyond the capabilities even for the states. It takes much time and money and for now it 
contributes to discouragement of such attempts. However, there is overwhelming evidence 
that terrorist groups and organizations show interest to obtain chemical and biological based 
weapons. Since their strategy is fear mongering, coercion and applying the highest possible 
damage, CBRN weapons are a great terrorists’ tool and it would be unwise to assume that they 
will stop acquiring such capabilities.
The prevention would not be complete if the likelihood of CBRN terrorism is completely 
overruled. Especially making radiological weapons is far more likely because it can be made 
of nuclear materials that are used in nuclear power plants. On the other hand, the likelihood of 
obtaining biological or chemical materials is much greater and therefore a lot more serious than 
the nuclear. In particular, the methods of disseminating biological weapons are different. With 
today’s trend of suicide bombers or terrorists who have no problem sacrifi cing for the ideology 
they represent, the possibility of simply using oneself as a bio-weapon should not be overruled. 
Infected terrorists could quite undetectably infect passengers at an international airport from 
where the virus could be spread in multiple directions.
The international community has identifi ed the existence of “rogue” and “unstable” 
countries as a specifi c type of threat to global security, especially those which used to have or 
still have programs for development and production of weapons of mass destruction. There is 
an ongoing process of destroying weapons of mass destruction in Libya and Syria. The inter-
national community closely monitors the activities regarding the nuclear power programs in 
Iran and North Korea. The most realistic scenario is a terrorist organization obtaining CBRN 
weapons through purchase from undemocratic countries as a fi nished product.
Finally, one should not exclude the possibility that the terrorists might use the threat of 
CBRN weapons to justify their consistency in the eyes of their supporters while also holding 
the opponents tensed, focused and most importantly, to get them spare more fi nancial resources 
and personnel to increase security at all levels. It can be argued that the very perception of threat 
from terrorist attacks with CBRN based weapons infl icts damage to the West.
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